Since their creation at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have stood as the principal pillars of the international financial architecture. Tasked with maintaining global economic stability and fostering development, these institutions have played a pivotal role in shaping the economic trajectories of Less-Developed Countries (LDCs), particularly during periods of acute financial crisis. The IMF was established to provide short-term credit to countries facing international balance of payments deficits, while the World Bank was designed to provide long-term loans for development and reconstruction. Together, they form a powerful duopoly of international financial agencies that guide LDC policy and provide critical capital inflows.

Despite their foundational mandates, the interventions of the IMF and World Bank have been the subject of persistent and often contentious debate. The central policy challenge revolves around the effectiveness and consequences of their prescribed remedies for economic distress. This paper will argue that while the Bretton Woods institutions were founded to ensure stability, their orthodox intervention framework, rooted in the Washington Consensus, proved institutionally rigid and often created greater social and economic instability than it resolved, necessitating a fundamental shift toward nationally-owned, context-specific reforms. It begins by examining the orthodox framework of stabilization and structural adjustment that has long defined the institutions’ approach to crisis management.